Child Support Modification  --  Divorcing State.

In a  Decision – Nolan v Gaeckler (an “Unreported Decision”) - the Court Held that child support modification would be determined in the Divorcing State where one party continued to reside in that State.

A snippet:

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), adopted by Georgia and New Jersey.
Read more . . .

Cohabitation  --  No Alimony.

In a  Decision – Quinn v Quin  - the Court Held that Alimony would terminate upon Cohabitation if that was what is set forth in the Marital Agreement.

A syllabus snippet:

There is a strong public policy favoring stability of arrangements in matrimonial matters.

Custody  --  3 Parents.

In a  Decision – D.G. and S.H. v. K.S  - the Court Held three (3) Adults would be the Legal and Residential Custodial parents of a child!

The Court deemed the non-biological parent to have attained ‘Psychological Parent’ status

A snippet:

The court thereby orders joint legal custody to all three parents with the plaintiff's having fifty percent residential custody and defendant having fifty percent residential custody - See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nj-superior-court-appellate-division/1725385.html#sthash.EQusYopv.dpuf. . .

In a  Decision – Fichter v Fichter  - the Court Held that under appropriate circumstances the cost of Automobile Insurance can be ADDED to Child Support!

In a Published Decision - State v DGM - the Court Held that the Defendant who was sitting near and briefly filming the victim at their child's soccer game did NOT violate a Domestic Violence Order.

SNIPPETS:

Defendant was "prohibited" defendant "from having any (oral, written, personal, electronic 3 A-5783-12T4 or other) form of contact or communication with" the Victim.

.. . .

Defendant was sitting near and briefly filming the Victim  at their six-year-old son's soccer game.

.. . .

Because defendant was acquitted in all other respects, we examine the sufficiency of the judge's conclusion that Defendant violated the FRO's "no contact" provision by recording Victim's image with his cellphone or, in the trial judge's words, whether "recording [her] was a form of contact."

.. . .

Although such conduct falls within the FRO's prohibition on "communication," we conclude that defendant could not have fairly anticipated this result. In applying the doctrine of lenity, we reverse.

. . .

Because, until today's decision, it was not clear whether the brief filming of a victim in an open and public place constituted a form of prohibited communication, defendant could not have known to a sufficient certainty that he was violating the FRO by engaging in the conduct found to have occurred by the trial judge.

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

3/26/15

In Published Decision "Elron", there existed a Child Support Order (pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines). Defendant successfully challenged supplemental child support added for extracurricular activities. The court held, inter alia, that Extracurricular Activities ARE included in Child Support (pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines).

SNIPPETS:

As to the cost of children's activities, the Guidelines specify a child support award includes entertainment expenditures, specifically "[f]ees, memberships and admissions to sports, recreational, or social events, lessons or instructions, movie rentals, televisions, mobile devices, sound equipment, pets, hobbies, toys, playground equipment, photographic equipment, film processing, video games, and recreational, exercise or sports equipment." Pressler & Verniero, supra, comment 8 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2631- 32. Guidelines support may be supplemented by court approved extraordinary expenses, which are. . .

predictable and recurring expenses for children that may not be incurred by average or intact families such as private elementary or secondary education, special needs of gifted or disabled children, and NCP/PAR time transportation expenses. The addition of these expenses to the basic obligation must be approved by the court. If incurred, special expenses that are not predictable and recurring should be shared by the parents in proportion to their relative incomes (i.e., the sharing of these expenses should be addressed in the general language of the order or judgment). Special expenses not included in the award should be paid directly to the parent who made or will make the expenditure or to the provider of the goods or services. [Pressler & Verniero, supra, comment 9 on Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2633.]

Finally, use of the Guidelines is rebuttable, as "[t]he [G]uidelines may be modified or disregarded by the court [] where good cause is shown," including "the presence of other relevant factors which may make the [G]uidelines inapplicable or subject to modification . . . ." R. 5:6A.

In her opinion, the trial judge did not explain why she deviated from the Guidelines by adding child-care and extracurricular activity costs as supplemental support. Reviewing the record we find plaintiff's assertions of need were not evidentially supported; they merely reflect her opinion. Such testimony fails to establish the "good cause" necessary for disregarding the Guidelines provisions. Ibid.

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

3/5/15

In an Unpublished Decision "Sapio", the Victim was employed by an entity within a vision center adjacent to a Walmart store. Defendant was barred from the Victim's "place(s) of employment". The Appellate Division determined that since Defendant was not barred from Walmart (as opposed to the Victim's place of employment).

SNIPPETS:

The FRO does not set forth with any specificity that defendant was barred from the Walmart store. N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(b)(6). The fact [ ] may have had to traverse over or 8 A-0674-13T1 through other locations to reach her place of employment does not convert such locations into areas from which defendant is banned.

. . .

Potentially, defendant is prohibited from entering these locations, but only if a court finds [ ] regularly frequents them and they are specifically identified in a domestic violence order. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(6)

.. . .

Accordingly, because the FRO did not prohibit defendant from entering the Walmart store, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly violated the FRO when he entered the store on June 10, 2013. Under these circumstances, defendant's conviction cannot stand.          

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

3/4/15

Default in Divorce

     - If you Try……..

         In an Unpublished Decision "Block", it was held that the trial judge erred both in entering a judgment of divorce by default and in later refusing to vacate the default judgment.  

It was alleged that the parties, to minimize costs, agreed to negotiate and that during the negotiations Defendant presented evidence that he suffered a myocardial infarction requiring hospitalization and provided a stipulation extending time to answer to his spouse and that Defendant had appeared at the Default Hearing. The Judge, nevertheless, entered Default Judgment!

SNIPPETS:

We need not discuss the matter at any great length. Our Court Rules are designed to promote the efficient administration of justice and the disposition of cases on their merits, not on procedural niceties. R. 1:1-2. As the Supreme Court has said, the Rules "should not in themselves be the source of any extensive litigation; they should be subordinated to their true role, i.e., simply a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits." Handelman v. Handelman, 17 N.J. 1, 10 (1954); see also Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 283-84 (1990); Stone v. Old Bridge Twp., 111 N.J. 110, 125 (1988) (Clifford, J., dissenting).

. . .

When defendant responded with a desire to file an answer and litigate if necessary, the judge should have permitted it. The judge's decision reveals none of the liberality required by the rules in these circumstances and exalted form over substance.

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

2/17/15

Allan Weinberg - Attorney at Law -  

 100 Craig Road,  Suite 102  Manalapan, NJ 07726

 732 80 NJ LAW (732) 806-5529

 AllanWEsq@GMail.com 

www.AllanWeinbergEsq.com

Twitter:       AllanWEsq      

FaceBook:  Allan Weinberg   

LinkedIn: AllanWeinberg                                                                                                   

Joint Legal Custody

     - And Then Some

         In an Unpublished Decision "Stewart", one Parent was more responsible and was afforded enhanced parenting rights notwithstanding the determination that Joint Legal Custody was appropriate.

SNIPPETS:

While joint custody is preferable, certain factors of the best interests of the child standard are paramount: the parents must be fit, must be willing to accept custody, and must be able to cooperate and communicate regarding essential matters of parenting.

. . .

Further, "the prime criteria for establishing a joint legal custodial relationship between divorced or separated parents centers on the ability of those parents to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the health, safety and welfare of the child notwithstanding animosity or acrimony they may harbor towards each other."

. . .

While generally fit, plaintiff was unable or unwilling to properly address the child's medical, educational, and developmental needs. Although the court awarded the parties joint legal custody, it fashioned an appropriate, equitable remedy by granting defendant sole legal authority to address the child's needs in the specific areas where plaintiff was deficient. As the judge aptly noted, the parties have in the past demonstrated an ability to communicate on major issues.

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

2/9/15

Allan Weinberg - Attorney at Law -  

 100 Craig Road,  Suite 102  Manalapan, NJ 07726

 732 80 NJ LAW (732) 806-5529

 AllanWEsq@GMail.com 

www.AllanWeinbergEsq.com

Twitter:       AllanWEsq      

FaceBook:  Allan Weinberg   

LinkedIn: AllanWeinberg                                                                                                   

Relocation in New Jersey

     - OK, If you are PPR (Parent of Primary Residence??

         In an Unpublished Decision "Clemas", the court held:

The motion judge, having reviewed the Agreement, found, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was the PPR, and as such, she was permitted to relocate within the state. The motion judge rejected defendant's argument that the language of the Agreement prevented plaintiff from having "enhanced rights" and concluded that language in the Agreement referred to the parties making joint legal custody decisions. The judge determined that the provision did not alter plaintiff's right to relocate.

…

The judge further determined that it was defendant's burden to demonstrate changed circumstances infringing upon the best interests of the children, defendant had not met his burden, and defendant was not entitled to a hearing on the matter because he had identified no reason why the new school district could not accommodate his children's needs, or demonstrate that he would not be able to maintain the same parenting schedule or "a reasonable alternative."

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The information contained in this communication is similar to ordinary telephone conversations and does not reflect the level of factual or legal inquiry which would be applied in the event a formal opinion was rendered by this firm. The information may also be confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. Nothing in this communication is intended to constitute a waiver of any privilege of the confidentiality of this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail or telephone and delete the original message and any copy of it from your computer system. This firm accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage from the use or receipt of this message and/or any attachments hereto, including any damage caused by virus.

1/31/15